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I. INTRODUCTION
In the corporate setting, government investigators increasingly
ask corporations to waive the attorney-client privilege as part of the
"cooperation" necessary to receive incentives.1 In practice, however,
these cooperation incentives have led to what has become known as a
"culture of waiver," where waiver of the privilege in the face of
investigation has become virtually essential. 2 One way courts have
sought to diminish the negative externalities of waiver is through the
doctrine of selective waiver. Selective waiver allows the corporation to
waive the attorney-client privilege, but only to the government agency
during the course of the investigation, while still retaining the right to
assert the privilege against third parties.
3
Thus far, the debate over selective waiver has focused on
whether selective waiver should be judicially recognized and how to
solve the unsettled nature of the law in the courts. Both the culture of
waiver and the uncertainty regarding the selective waiver doctrine's
validity have created tension between a corporate executive's personal
interests and fiduciary duties. As currently implemented, the selective
waiver doctrine may promote a perverse incentive for corporate
managers to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege in order
to be deemed "cooperative" individually and thereby decrease their
own personal criminal liability while potentially subjecting the
company to extensive third-party liability.4
1. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) & cmt. 12 (2004),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/CHAP8.pdf (explaining that full cooperation in an
investigation will lower a defendant organization's "culpability score" and that waiver may be
necessary for full cooperation).
2. See infra Part III.B.1.
3. Nolan Mitchell, Note, Preserving the Privilege: Codification of Selective Waiver and the
Limits of Federal Power over State Courts, 86 B.U. L. REV. 691, 697 (2006).
4. See infra Part III.A.1.
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Current and past proposed solutions fail to resolve this
problem. Efforts by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to reduce the
requirement of waiver within their cooperation policies 5 have done
little to ameliorate this tension. The proposed Attorney-Client
Privilege Protection Act ("ACPPA")6 also fails to eliminate either this
tension or the culture of waiver because it still allows for voluntary
waiver. The Judicial Conference's Proposed Rule of Evidence 502, 7
while nominally removing the threat of outside liability, allows
government agencies to share information, thereby subjecting a
company to threat of suit by another agency. Finally, the recently
adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 502,8 which rejects the selective
waiver language of the proposed rule, perpetuates the predictability
problem by allowing federal judges to determine the validity of
selective waiver on a case-by-case basis.
Discarding the selective waiver doctrine is not an option. The
realities of the culture of waiver and the inherent nature of corporate
investigations command adoption of selective waiver in a predictable,
codified form. Such an approach would preserve valuable policies
without creating negative externalities, such as conflicts between an
executive's personal interests and his fiduciary duties to the
corporation. Either new legislation or new language is needed to
amend the newly enacted Federal Rule 502 in a way that would
explicitly recognize selective waiver. Such legislation must protect
against both third-party liability and, unlike the formerly proposed
Rule 502, separate agency liability. This is the only way to align the
executive's personal and fiduciary roles appropriately. Such
codification is also needed to protect corporations while giving the
government the latitude it requires to investigate corporate crimes,
thereby reconciling the duty of protecting shareholders with the
preservation of the attorney-client privilege.
The purpose of this Note is to examine selective waiver and the
way that non-recognition of the doctrine creates perverse incentives
for corporate executives to abrogate their fiduciary duties. This Note
5. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Heads
of Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.govldag
speeches/2006/mcnultymemo.pdf.
6. For the language of the ACPPA, see S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c 1lO:s. 186.
7. JERRY E. SMITH, COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 5-6 (2006),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ExcerptEVReportPub.pdf. This language never
reached the Federal Rule of Evidence 502.
8. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
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suggests that the currently proposed solutions do not resolve this
tension and that new or amended legislation is needed to reconcile
these competing imperatives. Part II discusses the underlying policies
and use of attorney-client privilege waiver, the tension the waiver
requirement creates between corporations and government agencies,
and the use of selective waiver as a solution to this tension. Part III
critiques the current and proposed solutions through the lens of
predictability and fiduciary duty incentives. Part IV proposes a
codification of selective waiver law as a solution to the perverse
incentive problem, which will provide certainty and eliminate the
negative externalities created by currently available solutions.
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAIVER IN THE CORPORATE WORLD
This Part provides background information regarding the
selective waiver doctrine. Section A discusses the corporate attorney-
client privilege in general. Section B discusses the waiver of the
attorney-client privilege during government investigations of
corporations. Section C discusses the use of selective waiver to
promote information-gathering by the government agencies in their
investigations without subjecting the corporation to third-party
liability.
A. Corporate Attorney- Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure
communications made in confidence between a client and an attorney
for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance.9 The
attorney-client privilege exists "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients." 10 However, the
protection of this information is at odds with the judiciary's mission to
bring the truth to light.11 Construed narrowly, 12 the attorney-client
privilege is not absolute; divulging information to third parties waives
the confidentiality protection. 1
3
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68-72.
10. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
11. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 759
(6th ed. 2008).
12. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979) (arguing
that privilege "obstructs the search for truth" and should be "strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits' ") (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
13. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir.
1991) ("If clients themselves divulge such information to third parties, chances are that they
[Vol. 62:1:239242
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The world of corporate attorney-client privilege begins (and
often ends) with the Supreme Court's opinion in Upjohn Co. v. United
States.14 In Upjohn, corporate counsel gave out questionnaires that
requested information about alleged payments to foreign government
officials by the corporation's managers. 15  Corporate counsel
voluntarily notified the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), and the IRS
began its own investigation. 16 The IRS demanded copies of the
questionnaires and notes from the interviews, but the counsel's office
refused to provide them because it believed the requested materials
were protected under the attorney-client privilege.
17
Upjohn confirmed and clarified the application of the attorney-
client privilege to corporations.18 The Upjohn Court signaled an end to
conflicts over the extent and scrutiny of disclosure of attorney-client
communications in a corporate atmosphere, 19 ruling in favor of a
practical and flexible judicial approach.20 The Upjohn Court declined
to disseminate a comprehensive test; instead, the Court stressed the
importance of case-by-case decisions on privilege issues.21 While
Upjohn still serves as the baseline for attorney-client privilege in
corporate settings, the case-by-case analysis has been problematic in
its application. Thus, some courts have begun to develop more
systematic rules regarding the attorney-client privilege and its waiver,
relying on the policies from Upjohn.
22
would also have divulged it to their attorneys, even without the protection of the privilege. Thus,
once a client has revealed privileged information to a third party, the basic justification for the
privilege no longer applies .. " (quoting Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat:
Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1198, 1207 (1982))).
14. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
15. Id. at 386-87.
16. Id. at 387.
17. Id. at 387-88.
18. Id. at 389-97.
19. Prior to Upjohn, many courts employed a "control group" test, which extended privilege
only to communications between an attorney and a member of the corporation's designated
"control group" of executives, a group composed of individuals who are given a decisionmaking
function regarding the corporation's legal matters. Other courts used the "subject matter" or
"Harper & Row" test, where communication was privileged if: (1) the communication was
between an attorney and an employee of the corporation; (2) the employee's supervisors directed
the employee to make the communication; and (3) the subject matter of the communication dealt
with the employee's duties in the context of his employment. Katherine M. Weiss, Note, Upjohn
Co. v. United States as Support for Selective Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate
Criminal Investigations, 48 B.C. L. REV 501, 504-05 (2007).
20. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
21. Id.
22. See infra Part III.A.1.
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Since the waiver issue comes to the forefront in many
government investigations, the Upjohn Court's policies for corporate
attorney-client privilege continue to be salient. The Court espoused a
pragmatic view of the attorney-client privilege, 23  focusing on
increasing predictability, protecting the attorney's fact-gathering role
in the corporate context, and incentivizing self-policing and
compliance programs. 24 The Court noted that "[a]n uncertain privilege,
or one which [sic] purports to be certain but results in widely varying
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all. '25
The Court extolled the importance of frank communication and
information flow between corporate employees and corporate counsel
during internal investigations. 26 The Upjohn Court encouraged
voluntary compliance with the law by decreasing the conflicting
interests for attorneys who conduct internal investigations. 27 On the
one hand, the attorney has an incentive to promote compliance with
the law, and communications with low-level employees are essential to
maintaining compliance. 28 On the other hand, the attorney seeks to
avoid exposing the corporation to liability and has an incentive not to
interview low-level employees because the attorney-client privilege
may not protect these communications. 29 Specifically, the Court
recognized that judicial interpretation of the attorney-client privilege
can favor frank communication and voluntary compliance with the
law.
30
Without any Supreme Court clarification regarding selective
waiver, 31 the Upjohn policy should be dispositive when evaluating the
23. By resolving the conflict in favor of encouraging corporate self-policing and internal
investigations, the Upjohn Court demonstrated a utilitarian or functionalist pragmatic approach
to the attorney-client privilege. See Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 481 n.39 (1987) (citing Upjohn as
an example of reliance on utilitarian justifications); Jeanne Andrea Di Grazio, Note, The
Calculus of Confidentiality: Ethical and Legal Approaches to the Labyrinth of Corporate
Attorney-Client Communications via E-mail and the Internet - From Upjohn Co. v. United States
and Its Progeny to the Hand Calculus Revisited and Revised, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 553, 570 (1998)
("[T]he Upjohn holding can be interpreted as a functionalist approach.").
24. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-95. For a more in-depth analysis of the policy arguments in
Upjohn, the continuing policy concerns addressed in Upjohn, and the application of those
arguments to the selective waiver doctrine, see Weiss, supra note 19, at 506-08.
25. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 390-92.




31. The Supreme Court itself reaffirmed Upjohn's policy values in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518




validity of all attorney-client privilege interpretations, including
waiver of the privilege. The exceptions to the waiver doctrine
acknowledged by courts 32 are justified because they are "consistent
with the goal underlying the privilege."33 Thus, selective waiver of the
attorney-client privilege is tolerable insofar as it is consistent with the
rationales justifying the privilege itself.
34
B. Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver and Government Cooperation
Agreements
Corporations bear responsibility for their agents, including
corporate officers, who commit illegal acts or misconduct that (a) are
within the scope of the agents' employment; and (b) are intended, at
least in part, to benefit the corporation. 35 Consequently, criminal
actions by any individual within the corporation effectively may be
imputed to the entire corporation, even when the acts also violate
corporate policy. 36 Prosecutors need only prove that one agent of the
corporation committed the act-even if that actor did not have
criminal intent-to hold the corporation liable.37 This element of
vicarious liability has led to massive internal compliance
investigations conducted by the corporations themselves.
38
These internal compliance investigations, carried out by either
inside or outside corporate counsel, can be the greatest source of
information about the internal workings of the company. 39
Government agencies, with their limited resources and "outsider"
status, have a difficult time getting "inside" these corporate crimes.
Thus, often the government will look for means to obtain the results of
the corporation's internal investigations. One way the government
gains this information is by encouraging corporations to waive their
privilege using a reward system. Under the United States Sentencing
32. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1961) (allowing
communications to be shared with an accountant for purposes of obtaining legal advice from an
attorney without waiving the privilege).
33. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir.
1991).
34. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 700.
35. Liesa L. Richter, Corporate Salvation or Damnation? Proposed New Federal Legislation
on Selective Waiver, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 136 (2007).
36. Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact
of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 589 (2004).
37. Id.
38. Kathryn Keneally & Kenneth M. Breen, White Collar Crime: New Life for Selective




Commission's Organizational Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"),
culpable corporations are rewarded with drastically reduced fines if
they cooperate with the government. 40 Due to the increased number of
criminal sanctions for white collar crimes 41 and the almost nullifying
effect of the drastically reduced sentences, corporations subject to
government investigation often are left with little choice but to waive
the attorney-client privilege.
The Guidelines use a "culpability score" to determine a
corporation's sentencing level, ranging from one to ten, which is then
multiplied against a base fine for that particular crime. 42 This figure
is: "(1) the amount assigned to the offense that the organization has
committed by an offense level fine table; (2) the pecuniary gain to the
organization from the offense; or (3) the pecuniary loss from the
offense knowingly caused by the organization, whichever is greater."
43
The initial culpability score accorded to an organization is five, which
is increased or decreased by a series of codified aggravating or
mitigating factors. 44 One mitigating factor is cooperation, which
reduces the culpability score by five, potentially negating all corporate
culpability entirely. 45 The Guidelines require timely and thorough
cooperation to satisfy this requirement. Timeliness requires
contemporaneous cooperation with notification of criminal
investigation, while thoroughness requires disclosure of all relevant
information to investigating authorities necessary to "identify the
nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible for
the criminal conduct."46 The DOJ clarified, through a series of public
memoranda, 47 that disclosure of all relevant information may require
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. As a
result of the "cooperation" factor in its culpability score, a corporation
may receive a substantial reduction of its ultimate financial liability.
The cooperation incentive does not apply only to the
corporation as an entity; corporate actors who are personally liable for
40. Weiss, supra note 19, at 522.
41. See generally Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-
Oxley) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amendments in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
42. John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579,
619-20 (2005).
43. Id.
44. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2004), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/2004guid/CHAP8.pdf.
45. Hasnas, supra note 42, at 620.
46. Buchanan, supra note 36, at 594 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8C2.5 cmt. 12 (2004)).
47. See infra Part III.B.1.
246 [Vol. 62:1:239
PRAGMATIC SELECTIVE WAIVER
their criminal conduct if the corporation is found guilty also may
benefit from cooperation similarly. For example, prosecutors may file a
substantial assistance motion to favor individual corporate executives
who have "cooperated."48 These personal incentives may induce
managerial agents, who may be calling the shots during the
government investigation, to waive the corporation's attorney-client
privilege for their own benefit. This incentive creates a potential
conflict-of-interest between the corporate officers' own wellbeing and
their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.49 As a
result, the corporate executive will have a perverse incentive to side
with the government against the corporation that he has a duty to
manage. While appearing to be motivated to cooperate with the
government for the best interest of the corporation, the manager may
be acting clandestinely to reduce his own criminal liability by waiving
the corporation's attorney-client privilege.
C. Selective Waiver as a Solution to Tension
1. Selective Waiver in Government Investigations
Selective waiver allows the corporation to waive the attorney-
client privilege to allow the government access to the information
during the investigation while retaining the right to assert the
privilege against other parties. 50 Therefore, any protected information
disclosed to the government during investigations or enforcement is
not discoverable by potential private third-party litigants after
disclosure occurs, as would normally be the case. 51 Corporations and
government agencies are increasingly entering into selective waiver
agreements prior to any disclosure. 52 Corporations, in cooperation
with the government, can avoid the harsh penalty of complete waiver
48. Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Cooperators: The Government in Employer-Employee
Relationships, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 795, 798 (2002).
49. Id. at 804.
50. Andrew J. McNally, Note, Revitalizing Selective Waiver: Encouraging Voluntary
Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing By Restricting Third Party Access to Disclosed Materials, 35
SETON HALL L. REV. 823, 837 (2005).
51. See, e.g., In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289,
294 n.5 (6th Cir. 2002).
52. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 691. For an analysis of the origin of the selective waiver
controversy, see Richter, supra note 35, at 135-36. Courts also may imply selective waiver from
mere disclosure to government agencies, absent an agreement between private party and agency
that disclosure does not constitute waiver. Id.
2009] 247
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that privilege law requires and still obtain the benefits of full
cooperation with the government.
53
One problem with selective waiver occurs when corporations
perform internal investigations in reliance on these agreements and
unearth information that may later expose them to significant
liability-e.g., third-party derivative or class action lawsuits-if a
later court does not enforce the agreement. 54 Due to the prevailing
culture of waiver 55 and the incentive to obtain decreased criminal
penalties 56 through cooperation, corporations face a Hobson's choice.
5 7
They may either take the government's offer of "cooperation" and
make the corporation subject to potentially debilitating civil liability,
or face individual and corporate criminal penalties. As one
commentator observed:
[C]orporations often have little practical choice regarding disclosure. Pursuant to federal
policy and practices, they face considerable pressure to share the results of internal
investigations with federal agencies, both to demonstrate "cooperation" and to mitigate
potential civil and criminal penalties. Selective waiver agreements have developed as a
means to navigate between the pressures and perils surrounding such cooperation.
5 8
Enforceable selective waiver agreements allow corporations to
maintain legal compliance and conduct internal investigations, both of
which serve overall public policy goals and protect both consumers and
shareholders, even though these internal investigations potentially
produce fodder for future civil suits. However, courts do not always
enforce selective waiver agreements. If an agreement is not recognized
by the court, through the agreement the corporation has facilitated
third-party claims and increased the possibility of additional civil
penalties. Whether a particular court believes that selective waiver is
in accord with the Upjohn policies 59 or other policy considerations 60
determines whether a court will uphold selective waiver agreements.
53. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1420
(3d Cir. 1991) ("[D]isclosure of privileged information to any third party, including the
government, destroys the privilege.").
54. See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 692.
55. See infra Part III.B.1.
56. See supra Part II.B.
57. A Hobson's choice is an "apparently free choice when there is no real alternative."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionaryhobson's%20choice (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
58. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 692 (internal citations omitted).
59. See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
60. See infra Part III.A.
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2. Selective Waiver at Common Law
The selective waiver doctrine can be traced to the 1978 decision
of Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.61 Diversified Industries, Inc.
("Diversified") voluntarily produced subpoenaed materials to the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") pursuant to a securities
investigation. 62 In subsequent litigation, a third party sought to
compel Diversified to produce these materials, claiming either that the
materials were not covered by the attorney-client privilege or,
alternatively, that the privilege had been waived by disclosure to the
SEC. 63 The court held that voluntary disclosure of privileged materials
to the SEC did not waive the privilege. 64 According to the en banc
court,
As Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and nonpublic SEC
investigation, we conclude that only a limited waiver of the privilege occurred. To hold
otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to
employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect
stockholders, potential stockholders, and customers.
6 5
From this lone paragraph the selective waiver doctrine was born.66
Despite the Eighth Circuit's initial adoption of the selective
waiver doctrine, the concept has gained little judicial support in
subsequent years. Just three years after the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Meredith, the D.C. Circuit rejected the selective waiver doctrine in
Permian Corp. v. United States.67 There, a corporation sought to enjoin
the SEC from giving documents to another government agency instead
of third-party litigants.68 The D.C. Circuit found that a limited waiver
would not "serve the interests underlying the common-law privilege
for confidential communications between attorney and client. ' 69 The
court noted that the justification for granting the privilege "ceases
when the client does not appear to have been desirous of secrecy."70
The court further explained that a selective waiver exception
61. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
62. Id. at 599.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 611.
65. Id. (internal citations omitted).
66. The court justified selective waiver with the policy of encouraging internal
investigations by corporations, not with the policy of divulging confidential information to the
government. Id.
67. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
68. Id. at 1215.
69. Id. at 1220.
70. Id. (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2311, at
599 (McNaughton Rev. 1961)).
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effectively would transform the privilege into a tactical litigation tool,
which was not the purpose for which the privilege was designed.
71
Finally, the court rejected the "government necessity" argument,
stating that it was "aware of no congressional directive or judicially-
recognized priority system that places a higher value on cooperation
with the SEC."
72
The Sixth Circuit rejected selective waiver as to both attorney-
client privilege and attorney work-product in In re Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corporation.73 In that case, the corporation agreed to
produce some internal audits to the DOJ in exchange for a cooperation
agreement with stringent confidentiality provisions.74 When private
litigants sought an order compelling the production of privileged
documents, 75 the Sixth Circuit rejected the corporation's selective
waiver defense, finding its waiver "complete and final."76 The Sixth
Circuit conceded that selective waiver encourages disclosure to
government agencies, but it reasoned that the attorney-client privilege
was never designed "to protect conversations between the client and
the government," and the court questioned whether the government
should enter into such agreements.
77
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit seemed to join the majority of
circuits in rejecting selective waiver,78 although it did not completely
foreclose its use in future cases. In In re Qwest Communications
International Securities Litigation, documents were again provided to
the DOJ and SEC pursuant to subpoenas and written confidentiality
agreements. 79 When civil plaintiffs subsequently sought these same
materials, the magistrate judge found that Qwest had waived its
privilege.80 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the record did
not "justify adoption of a selective waiver doctrine as an exception to
the general rules of waiver upon disclosure of protected material."
81
Because the Quest court expressly noted that its holding depended
71. Id. at 1221.
72. Id.
73. In re ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 306-07
(6th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at 292.
75. Id. at 293.
76. Id. at 302-07.
77. Id. at 302-03.
78. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1200 (10th Cir. 2006).
79. Id. at 1181.
80. Id. at 1182.
81. Id. at 1192.
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solely upon the record of the case, the doctrine of selective waiver may
be open for consideration in the lower courts in the Tenth Circuit.8 2
Federal and state courts' views of selective waiver have been
inconsistent, and the doctrine remains unsettled. The lack of a
uniform approach to selective waiver complicates a corporation's
decision to waive its attorney-client privilege to the government
by making it difficult for a corporation and its attorneys to predict
whether these agreements will be upheld.83  Selective waiver
agreements are rejected by a majority of courts, although the
reasoning differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and few courts have
been willing to recognize selective waiver under certain conditions.8 4
This doctrinal dissonance can be divided into three basic camps: (1)
disclosure to a government agency completely waives attorney-client
and work-product privileges; 8 5 (2) disclosure to a government agency
does not constitute waiver per se;8 6 and (3) selective waiver is
permissible only in situations in which the government has signed a
binding confidentiality agreement prior to the disclosure.8 7 The
majority of courts fall into the first camp, rejecting selective waiver
entirely because they are not convinced that the policy justifications
for the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine can override
the traditional rules governing waiver.88 However, courts at both the
district and appellate level have found these exogenous policy
considerations sufficiently compelling to uphold selective waiver
agreements. Many district courts evaluate the application of the
selective waiver doctrine on a case-by-case basis because the law
remains unsettled and circuit courts have not provided clear guidance.
III. UNSETTLED NATURE OF SELECTIVE WAIVER JURISPRUDENCE:
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
This Part discusses the problems caused by the
unpredictability in courts' adoption of selective waiver and the
solutions that promote the Upjohn principles and pragmatic policies.
82. Id.
83. See infra Part III.
84. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
85. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 697-98.
86. Id. at 698.
87. Zach Dostart, Comment, Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 734 (2006). There is an additional
variation in the third camp, as at least one court has allowed selective waiver to opinion work-
product, but not to fact work-product. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ.01-
CV014551REBCBS, 2006 WL 278279, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 2, 2006).
88. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 701.
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First, Section A discusses the attorney-client privilege and the
perverse incentives for corporate executives to waive the privilege
without due regard to the shareholders' best interests. Section B
examines potential solutions to the problems surrounding selective
waiver.
A. The Tension Between Government Investigations and Corporate
Attorney- Client Privilege
1. The Unsettled Nature of Selective Waiver in the Courts
The different approaches to selective waiver in the circuit
courts reflect differences in balancing the policies that justify selective
waiver and those that call for its rejection. Each court purports to
uphold the Upjohn principles, but each has its own interpretation of
what the Upjohn principles are. The case-by-case determination
championed by the Upjohn decision is the only portion of the decision
that has been unanimously upheld in selective waiver jurisprudence.
The Eighth Circuit in Diversified is the only circuit court to expressly
adopt the selective waiver doctrine.8 9 The circuits that purportedly
reject selective waiver are the First,90 Second, 91 Third,92 Fourth,93
Sixth, 94 Seventh, 95 Tenth,96 D.C.,97 and Federal Circuits.98 Often,
89. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
90. See United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684-86 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting
the Diversified approach, forcing MIT to disclose audits obtained by the Department of Defense
to the IRS). But see United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that "[i]f
there were ever an argument for limited waiver, it might well depend importantly on just what
had been disclosed to the government and on what understandings"). Thus, even with precedent
established, the First Circuit has developed a case-by-case analysis; the First Circuit is open to
recognizing selective waiver dependant on the facts.
91. See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (agreeing with the Permian
court's decision and reasoning). But see In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir.
1993) (denying application of selective waiver under the particular facts before the court, but
declining to adopt a per se rule that all voluntary disclosures waive work-product protection).
92. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d
Cir. 1991) ("[S]elective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one's
attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance; it merely encourages voluntary disclosure
to government agencies, thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended purpose."); see also
In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d at 235 ("[S]elective assertion of privilege should not be
merely another brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or
strategic advantage.").
93. ' See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting selective
waiver for attorney-client privilege and non-opinion work product).
94. See In re ColumbiaJHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302
(6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting "the concept of selective waiver, in any of its various forms").
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however, these rejections are merely fact-based, non-precedential
opinions; thus, they are subject to change. The First Circuit, while
technically recognized as rejecting selective waiver, has actually
advocated for a case-by-case analysis when deciding whether to
recognize selective or "limited" waiver.99 Other courts supposedly
rejecting selective waiver, such as those in the Second Circuit, refuse
to establish a per se rule, leaving the selective waiver doctrine open to
different interpretations. 100 As the Tenth Circuit recognized in Qwest,
these cases are fact-specific. 101 Thus, many courts of appeals merely
find that selective waiver was unenforceable on the facts adjudicated
and do not reject selective waiver in other cases. The Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have not yet addressed the doctrine, and there is no
clear consensus in the district courts of these circuits. Federal
selective waiver jurisprudence is thus in "a state of hopeless
confusion."
0 2
Even within "settled" circuits, without Supreme Court
precedent or a per se basis of interpretation, attorneys and
corporations cannot predict whether precedent will be followed when
they decide to enter selective waiver agreements. Richard Humes,
Associate General Counsel for the SEC, asks if securities lawyers may
"tell their corporate clients in good faith that they should execute
these confidentiality agreements with any realistic expectation that
they will be given effect by a court presiding over a private action
95. See Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (7th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting selective waiver, but leaving open the possibility that selective waiver conditioned on
the presence of a confidentiality agreement might be sustainable).
96. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1201 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding
that "the record in this case does not justify adoption of selective waiver" (emphasis added)).
97. See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 121-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting
limited or selective waiver of documents provided to the SEC).
98. See Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citing the Permian decision and rejecting the limited waiver theory).
99. United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 1995) ("If there were ever an
argument for limited waiver, it might well depend importantly on just what had been disclosed
to the government and on what understandings.").
100. See In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) (denying application
of selective waiver under the particular facts before the court, but declining to adopt a per se rule
that all voluntary disclosures waive work-product protection).
101. In re Qwest Commc'ns, 450 F.3d at 1201. The Qwest court noted repeatedly that it was
deciding the case on the basis of the record before it and seemed to be particularly skeptical of
Qwest's arguments because the agreement was entered into while Qwest was already in private
litigation concerning the same subject matter; thus, Qwest knew that the documents were likely
to be subpoenaed and that the risk of finding a waiver was substantial. Id.
102. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294-95
(6th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993)) (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
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against the company in [sic] which the internal report is sought?"10 3
He acknowledges that while a lawyer has an obligation to advise his
client as to the state of the law in any particular district court or
circuit, there has been no precedential decision rejecting selective
waiver in many jurisdictions, nor any Supreme Court precedent on the
issue. 10 4 Thus, it is reasonable in any jurisdiction to advise a client to:
(1) sign a selective waiver agreement with the government; and (2)
rely on a court to uphold the agreement based on the unique facts of
the case. Even in jurisdictions where it is "settled" that courts reject
the selective waiver doctrine, reliance on a selective waiver agreement
would not be frivolous or unreasonable because of the case-specific
nature of these decisions. Accordingly, the decision to make a selective
waiver agreement, even when against precedent, could not be
challenged, even if it is not in the best interest of the corporation.
Even in jurisdictions ruling against selective waiver, judges
have made compelling arguments in support of selective waiver. For
example, Judge Danny Julian Boggs's dissent in the Sixth Circuit
made a persuasive case for selective waiver, focusing on a "more
pragmatic approach" 10 5 that looks at incentives for corporate privilege
holders under the third-party waiver rule and the public policy
underlying cooperation with government agencies. 10 6 Judge Boggs
noted that policy questions "are at the heart of the privilege inquiry,"
and privilege rules should be decided with an eye toward the public
interest and potential negative side effects. 0 7 Looking at Upjohn,
Judge Boggs could not find any rule "narrowly constraining the
considerations that courts may take into account in developing rules
regarding a common law privilege or requiring that courts turn a blind
eye to the practical effect of the privilege rules that they are charged
to create."108
As long as the validity of these agreements remains unsettled,
''corporations may be dissuaded from full cooperation with
investigative agencies, and the government's ability to discover and
103. Richard Humes, Remarks of an SEC Associate General Counsel, 57 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 341, 353 (2007).
104. Id.
105. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 309 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Judge Boggs found no
need to tie selective waiver to the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege: "It is not
clear why an exception to the third-party waiver rule need be moored to the justifications of the
attorney-client privilege." Id. at 308 (emphasis omitted).
106. Id. at 309-10.




prosecute corporate wrongdoing may suffer." 10 9 Without a predictable
selective waiver doctrine, neither the government nor private parties
are likely to obtain the privileged information because of the
disincentives created. 110 This furthers the truth-seeking process by
increasing total access to information despite prohibiting disclosure to
third-party litigants, which is the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege itself.'11 Government agency acquisition of this information
serves public interests; yet satisfying that interest can be
appropriately achieved by carving out a right of limited use to
preserve the privilege against use by potential third-party litigants.
1 2
2. The Problem of Perverse Incentives and Fiduciary Duty for
Corporate Officers
There has been very little scholarship addressing the effects of
selective waiver on corporate CEOs and other officers who may face
perverse incentives when making the decision to waive the attorney-
client privilege. Much of the scholarship regarding selective waiver
focuses on its impact on government investigations,11 3 its impact on
corporate attorney-employee relationships, 114 traditional attorney-
client privilege concerns,11 5 fundamental fairness, 1 6 constitutional
and congressional rights,11 7 and other facets of the selective waiver
issue. Abstraction of the corporate entity is easy and common (and
109. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 698.
110. See In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312-13 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("Without the
exception, much otherwise disclosed material would stay completely in the dark, under the
absolute cover of privilege. The exception aids the government in bringing violations of the law to
light.").
111. See id. at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (arguing that "a government investigation
exception to the third-party waiver rule would increase the information available over that
produced by the court's rule and would aid the truth-seeking process."). Judge Boggs concluded
that "[a]s the harms of selective disclosure are not altogether clear, the benefits of the increased
information to the government should prevail." Id. at 311.
112. Id. at 311-12.
113. See, e.g., Jody E. Okrzesik, Selective Waiver: Should the Government be Privy to
Privileged Information Without Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Doctrine?, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 115 (2003) (proposing that federal courts adopt selective waiver
with a valid confidentiality agreement as a compromise).
114. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 36, at 590.
115. See, e.g., McNally, supra note 50 (advocating the adoption of a modified selective waiver
doctrine).
116. See, e.g., Michael Dore, A Matter of Fairness: The Need for a New Look at Selective
Waiver in SEC Investigations, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 761 (2006) (arguing in favor of selective waiver
based on notions of fairness).
117. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 3, at 691.
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useful in many situations);1 8 it is often difficult to remember the
people involved when formulating policy. As executives make human
choices for the corporation, however, they face a series of Hobson's
choices when deciding whether to assert or waive the attorney-client
privilege. 119 Fiduciary duties require corporate executives to act in the
best interest of the company and its shareholders. However, in cases
in which the executive is also implicated in the alleged wrongdoing,
the risk of personal liability may sufficiently distract the executive
from duties to the corporation. This may create a perverse incentive
for the executive to act in ways counter to the company's interests by
exposing the entity to greater liability in order to minimize personal
liability. 1
20
The government's escalating demands for waiver of the
attorney-client privilege in investigations have become particularly
problematic for corporate agents.' 2' It is not inherently wrong for
corporations to waive the attorney-client privilege to demonstrate
cooperation in exchange for obtaining incentives in government
investigations, but problems occur when waiver is against the
shareholders' best interest. Conflicts between the corporation and the
118. See CHARLES R. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 141 (5th ed. 2006).
119. William R. McLucas et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 636, 641 (2006):
Currently, the process of an internal investigation may well force executives
and employees into a series of Hobson's choices. As a practical matter,
executives and employees must participate in the investigation interviews or
else lose their jobs. Then, having participated - or having considered
participating - in the interviews, an executive or employee may decide he
wants outside counsel to guide him through the process. While the employee
might reasonably expect his company to help pay the legal bills associated
with an inquiry into the work he did for the company - and most companies
do so - the DOJ or the SEC policies often disfavor such support, depending
upon how the government views the individual's conduct. These individuals
may be left in the difficult position of paying their own legal fees or else
forfeiting legal representation. ...
A related casualty of this new trend of waiver demands peculiar to public
corporations is its effect on the willingness of business leaders to assume
board positions. Facing increased administrative responsibilities and costs as
well as decreased nimbleness in managing companies that results from this
imbalance of prosecutorial power, the most qualified candidates now often
refuse board positions - a trend that hurts our markets by draining the most
qualified human capital and thereby decreasing the efficiency of public
corporations.
120. Id. at 641-42.
121. Id. at 636.
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managing executives occur even where the executives act with the
good-faith belief that their actions were appropriate and in the
company's best interests. 122 When directors and executives face
individual indictment, they are less likely to look out for the
shareholders' best interests or "reason through to a sound decision.
'123
The government pressures on executives to waive privilege erode the
traditional commitment of a company's fiduciaries to the corporate
enterprise. 124 The executive's first instinct is to protect himself, not to
defend the company from third-party litigants or government
oppression.1 25 This may place an executive of the company in a
diametrically opposed position relative to the corporation, aligning his
interests with those of the government instead of the corporation.
B. Potential Solutions Posited to Relieve the Tension Between
Corporations and the Government Regarding Selective Waiver
Several solutions have been advanced to resolve the uncertain
nature of selective waiver. These solutions, however, may have
significant implications for the fiduciary relationship. This Note
evaluates these potential solutions from the perspective of the officers
and directors of the corporation, for whom the incentives and
disincentives are created and who may be subject to individual
criminal liability.
1. Governmental Cooperation Without Waiver-Culture of Waiver
Concerns
Recognizing the pervasive culture of waiver, the DOJ
ostensibly attempted to eliminate the privilege waiver through a
series of official memoranda. A 1999 DOJ memorandum, later known
as the "Holder Memo," considered, inter alia, "[t]he corporation's
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to
cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the
waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work-product
122. Id. ("[T]he Government frequently seeks internal investigation reports authored by
legal counsel, witness interviews conducted by counsel in connection with internal
investigations, notes made by counsel, and documents that evidence the legal advice provided by
counsel during the internal investigation." (citing MARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY LIABILITY
AFrER SARBANES-OXLEY § 7.03 (2005))).





privileges." 126 Similarly, in 2001 the SEC published considerations for
adequate cooperation, asking such questions as: "Did the company
promptly make available to our staff the results of its review and
provide sufficient documentation reflecting its response to the
situation? [And d]id the company voluntarily disclose information [to]
our staff ... [that we] otherwise might not have uncovered?"1 27 The
SEC further clarified that "in some cases the desire to provide
information to the Commission may cause companies to consider
waiving their attorney-client privilege rights."128 Although they do not
explicitly require waiver of attorney-client privilege, these memoranda
provided DOJ and SEC attorneys with administrative support for
requesting waiver during negotiations with corporate officers to obtain
their "cooperation." Rather than representing any true shift in policy,
these memoranda made the pressure to waive more surreptitious.
In 2003, the DOJ reaffirmed its position on waiver of the
attorney-client privilege in the Thompson Memorandum:
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a corporation's
cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver of the
attorney-client and work-product protections .... [Privilege waivers] are often critical in
enabling the government to evaluate the completeness of a corporation's voluntary
disclosure and cooperation. 
1 2 9
Critics protested that these DOJ policies made waivers a de facto
prerequisite for being considered "cooperative." This prerequisite has
led to a culture of waiver in which waiver of the attorney-client
privilege by corporations is almost automatic and is viewed by
corporate counsel as an unspoken prerequisite for receiving the
benefits associated with "cooperation." To combat this criticism, the
DOJ issued the McNulty Memorandum, which attempted to mitigate
concerns about the seemingly imperative nature of the waiver
requirement by requiring only the "least intrusive waiver necessary to
conduct a complete and thorough investigation."' 130  In theory,
126. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Heads of
Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999), available at www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html.
127. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.govflitigationinvestreport/34-44969.htm.
128. Id.
129. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at www.usdoj.
gov/dag/cftfcorporate-guidelines.htm.
130. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Heads




therefore, the DOJ could investigate corporate malfeasance
aggressively while exercising discretion in requesting waiver of the
attorney-client privilege.
However, the nature of white collar criminal investigations
almost invariably requires waiver of the attorney-client privilege,
proving that in practice waiver will not merely be requested when
"necessary," as the DOJ has previously stated.131 Furthermore, the
inertia created by the culture of waiver makes it hard to believe that
corporate counsel would suddenly feel no pressure to waive the
privilege, even if the DOJ does not define it as strictly necessary. The
danger of the DOJ's iterative and remedial steps is that these steps
create an illusion of a policy shift without following through in
practice. 132 Critics of this "evolving" DOJ policy on waiver therefore
have reviled the McNulty Memorandum as "but a modest
improvement," arguing that the revised DOJ statement "falls far short
of what is needed to prevent further erosion of fundamental attorney-
client privilege" during government investigations. 133
2. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act Legislation
Congress, noting the problem with attorney-client privilege
waiver in the government's corporate investigations, put forth its own
proposed solution to the problem of selective waiver: the Attorney-
Client Privilege Protection Act 134  ("ACPPA").1 35 The ACPPA is
endorsed by the ACLU, 136 the Association of Corporate Counsel, 37 and
131. Id. at 7.
132. See Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, 5 A.B.A. J.
EREPORT 49, 49 (2006) ("The Justice Department's new corporate charging guidelines for federal
prosecutors fall far short of what is needed to prevent further erosion of fundamental attorney-
client privilege, work product and employee protections during government investigations."
(quoting ABA President Karen J. Mathis)).
133. Id. The ABA continues to urge passage of the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of
2006, which is basically an echo of the ABA position on the issue. Id.
134. For the language of the Act, see S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (search "Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act"; then follow "S.186.IS"
hyperlink).
135. On January 4, 2007, Senator Specter reintroduced the Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act of 2007. The legislation was originally introduced on December 7, 2006. See Carrie
Johnson, Higher Hurdles Set in Corporate Crime Cases: Business Pressure Spurs Change, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 2006, at D1.
136. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Welcomes Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act, Says Bill Would Safeguard Constitutional Right to Counsel (Dec. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/gen/27637prs20061207.html.
137. Press Release, Ass'n of Corporate Counsel, What Does the DOJ's Issuance of the




American Bar Association ("ABA") President Karen Mathis. 138 Its
stated purpose is to "place on each agency clear and practical limits
designed to preserve the attorney-client privilege and work-product
protections available to an organization and protect the constitutional
rights and other legal protections available to employees of such an
organization." 13 9 The organizations that advocate for the proposed
legislation believe it would remove attorney-client privilege waiver
from considerations of "cooperation" altogether. 140 However, this
argument fails to consider the provisions of the ACPAA that still allow
for voluntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
The ACPPA lays out a bright-line rule regarding the waiver of
attorney-client privilege by corporations and other organizations
during government investigations. Under the ACPPA, the United
States may not "demand, request, or condition treatment on the
disclosure by an organization, or person affiliated with that
organization, of any communication protected by the attorney-client
privilege or any attorney work-product."141 Agents or attorneys of the
United States also may not "condition a civil or criminal charging
decision relating to a [sic] organization, or person affiliated with that
organization, on... any valid assertion of the attorney-client privilege
or privilege for attorney work-product." 142 To justify its bright-line
rule, Congress listed its policy findings within the ACPPA, explaining
that the ACPPA could be the solution to the plethora of problems
associated with waiver during government investigations.1 43
138. Press Release, ABA, Statement by ABA President Karen J. Mathis Regarding Revisions
to the Justice Department's Thompson Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/abanet/medialstatement/statement.cfm?releaseid=59.
139. S. 186.
140. Richter, supra note 35, at 146-48.
141. S. 186 § 3(a).
142. Id.
143. These findings by Congress include:
(1) Justice is served when all parties to litigation are represented by
experienced diligent counsel.
(2) Protecting attorney-client privileged communications from compelled
disclosure fosters voluntary compliance with the law.
(3) To serve the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, attorneys and clients
must have a degree of confidence that they will not be required to disclose
privileged communications.
(4) The ability of an organization to have effective compliance programs and
to conduct comprehensive internal investigations is enhanced when there is
clarity and consistency regarding the attorney-client privilege.
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The ACPPA is intended to significantly alleviate the pressure
on corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege under the DOJ
policy and the Sentencing Guidelines. 144 The ACPPA provides
maximum protection for corporations seeking to assert the attorney-
client privilege in a government investigation. Under the ACPPA's
bright-line rule, prosecutors may not consider corporations'
willingness to waive the privilege either in making a charging decision
or in determining cooperation, thereby quashing selective waiver-
even in jurisdictions that recognize it.
Most of the ACPPA's critics focus on the effect it has on
investigations. Because cooperation agreements are important law
enforcement tools, any inhibition of the creation of these agreements
would be costly for government agencies. Enactment and codification
of the ACPPA would do little to encourage cooperation and, as such,
the ACPPA is not in the best interests of federal prosecutors.
145
Although the ACPPA may allow for a free flow of honest
communication between corporate employees, it may inhibit any flow
(5) Prosecutors, investigators, enforcement officials, and other officers or
employees of government agencies have been able to, and can continue to,
conduct their work while respecting attorney-client and work product
protections and the rights of individuals, including seeking and discovering
facts crucial to the investigation and prosecution of organizations.
(6) Despite the existence of these legitimate tools, the Department of Justice
and other agencies have increasingly employed tactics that undermine the
adversarial system of justice, such as encouraging organizations to waive
attorney-client privilege and work product protections to avoid indictment or
other sanctions.
(7) An indictment can have devastating consequences on an organization,
potentially eliminating the ability of the organization to survive
postindictment or to dispute the charges against it at trial.
(8) Waiver demands and other tactics of government agencies are
encroaching on the constitutional rights and other legal protections of
employees.
(9) The attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, and payment of
counsel fees shall not be used as devices to conceal wrongdoing or to cloak
advice on evading the law.
id. §§ 2(a)(1)-(9).
144. See supra Part II.B.
145. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 902 (2006)
(emphasizing the importance of cooperation for prosecutors in light of the time and cost involved
with investigations).
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of information from the corporate entity to the government because
waiver may no longer be requested but merely volunteered. Relatedly,
investigators may be forced to garner information from other sources,
such as costly investigations or extended discovery.
146
At first blush, the ACPPA is potentially an effective solution to
the waiver problems. On its surface, it is the solution most
conceptually similar to the majority of courts' interpretations of
Upjohn because it adheres to the traditional notions of the attorney-
client privilege. Its enactment would settle the issues surrounding
selective waiver by dispensing with requests for attorney-client
privilege waiver altogether. Proponents assert that under the auspices
of the ACPPA, waiver of the attorney-client privilege would not be
utilized in the tactical way that is so often criticized in the selective
waiver doctrine. Corporations would not be able to utilize waiver of
the privilege for their own benefit, and the government would not be
able to compel waiver of a traditional protection. The ACPPA, in
accordance with Upjohn, would provide predictability because
codification of the rule would make it explicit that government
agencies could not request waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The
predictability of a statutory rule ostensibly could reduce or eliminate
the perverse incentive for corporate officers to waive the privilege in
order to be deemed cooperative for purposes of their personal civil or
criminal liability because the executives no longer would be exposing
the corporation to uncertain third-party liability.
In practice, however, the ACPPA actually undermines Upjohn
policy goals. The Act does not proscribe voluntary disclosures; in fact,
it explicitly allows them. 147 Allowing a voluntary waiver would be
more clandestine than allowing an open request that may be subject to
judicial oversight, making it more difficult for courts to determine
whether it was unreasonably compelled by government agencies. A
corporate executive may still be personally motivated to relinquish the
corporation's privilege to the government voluntarily, even when it is
not in the corporation's best interest, in order to reduce his personal
risk of liability. Government agencies could still offer selective waiver
146. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 303 (recognizing
that when a corporation waives the privilege, "[clonsiderable savings are realized to the
government, and through it to the public, in time and fiscal expenditure related to the
investigation of crimes and civil fraud"); Brown, supra note 145, at 902 (suggesting that DOJ
policy supporting privilege waivers is driven by a desire for "efficiency and cost savings").
147. S. 186 § 3(a) ("Voluntary Disclosures- Nothing in this Act is intended to prohibit an
organization from making, or an agent or attorney of the United States from accepting, a
voluntary and unsolicited offer to share the internal investigation materials of such
organization.").
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to those corporations that voluntarily relinquish their attorney-client
privilege. Furthermore, the culture of waiver would not be
"dispelled"-the government would not be allowed to request it, but
could accept it. Even without an explicit request, the result would be
similar to that described by the DOJ memoranda: the culture of
waiver would still prevail, but it would be less transparent, and
consequently, even more difficult for the judiciary to scrutinize. There
would be little chance that the corporation would not voluntarily
waive the privilege. The only way to avoid this result completely
would be to disallow waiver altogether in these investigations, which
is not feasible since waiver is often necessary to investigate and
prosecute corporate crimes.
C. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502
The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
published proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502 as a solution to the
selective waiver problem ("Proposed Rule 502").148 This is the only
solution that not only allows for selective waiver, but also codifies it,
aligning all of the federal courts. The Proposed Rule 502 was a
response to escalating concerns in Congress over the risk of third-
party liability posed by the failure of most courts of appeals to
recognize selective waiver. The proposed rule's language was not
limited to treating the problem of selective waiver to government
entities, 149 but also increased predictability that was lacking in
attorney-client privilege jurisprudence. 150 The most controversial
provision of Proposed Rule 502151 was its "selective waiver" provision,
148. See generally Memorandum from the Honorable Jerry E. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm.
on Evidence Rules, to the Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice
& Procedure, Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidentiary Rules (May 19, 2007), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ExcerptEVReportPub.pdf.
149. See id. at 2. Risks include the fact that "significant amounts of time and effort are
expended during litigation to preserve the privilege" and that "[plarties must be extremely
careful, because if a privileged document is produced, there is a risk that a court will find a
subject matter waiver that will apply not only to the instant case and document but to other
cases and documents as well." Id. Furthermore, "an enormous amount of expense is put into
document production in order to protect against inadvertent disclosure of privileged information,
because the producing party risks a ruling that even a mistaken disclosure can result in a
subject matter waiver." Id.
150. Richter, supra note 35, at 155 n.109. The provisions regarding privilege generally and
its inefficiencies have been widely supported. Id. The proposed rule as a whole met two major
purposes: to "resolve some longstanding disputes in the courts about the effect of certain
disclosures" and answer to "the widespread complaint that litigation costs for review and
protection of material that is privileged or work-product have become prohibitive." Id.
151. There has been a "mixed response to the concept of selective waiver." Id.
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which provided that disclosure of protected information to a federal
agency would not constitute a waiver as to any non-government
entities.152 The language of the rule published for comment reads:
In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communication or information covered
by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection-when made to a federal
public office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement
authority--does not operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of non-
governmental persons or entities ..... Nothing in this rule limits or expands the
authority of a government agency to disclose communications or information to other
government agencies or as otherwise authorized or required by law.
15 3
The language of the proposed rule essentially adopts the doctrine of
selective waiver created by the Eighth Circuit. 15 4 This proposed
language, now withdrawn, would have established predictable
selective waiver jurisprudence in favor of allowing corporations to
selectively waive their privilege during government investigations.
The language of Proposed Rule 502 would help alleviate the
risk of subject matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work-
product protection. The Committee was concerned that companies
may be deterred from cooperating with the government because court
decisions are so unpredictable. 155 Recognizing that there is still
significant uncertainty throughout the jurisdictions,156 the Committee
noted that "[a] rule protecting selective waiver [during government
agency investigations or enforcement] furthers the important policy of
cooperation with government agencies, and maximizes the
effectiveness and efficiency of government investigations."157 Codifying
selective waiver would both eliminate uncertainty regarding judicial
recognition of the doctrine and provide the predictability necessary for
corporate cooperation with government agencies.
The controversial selective waiver provision of proposed Rule
502 generated "almost uniformly negative" public comment from the
legal community. 158 Many of these criticisms mirrored the courts'
reasons for rejecting selective waiver. 159 "Ironically, corporate counsel
152. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 5-6.
153. Id.
154. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978).
155. SMITH, supra note 7, at 2.
156. Id. at 12.
157. Id. (citing In re ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289,
314 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting)). The Committee agrees with Judge Boggs's finding
that "the 'public interest in easing government investigations' justifies a rule that disclosure to
government agencies of information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work product
protection does not constitute a waiver to private parties." Id. at 12-13.
158. Richter, supra note 35, at 158.
159. See supra Part III.A.1.
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who have long sought selective waiver protection in the courts opposed
the proposed evidence rule because it would eliminate the most
readily identifiable punitive consequence for corporations cooperating
with the government."'160 Codifying selective waiver would eliminate
the risk that these selective waiver agreements would be rejected by
the courts. Corporations would no longer risk third-party liability if
they waived the privilege. Therefore, the government would no longer
accept the risk of litigation as a legitimate excuse. However, this
argument neglects to acknowledge that the culture of waiver already
exists.16
1
Looking at the Upjohn principles, it seems that most of these
criticisms are missing the mark. Proposed Rule 502 as originally
drafted is the only solution that expressly codifies selective waiver.
Codification of this doctrine is the only way to adhere fully to the
Upjohn principles. While Upjohn is widely cited as upholding the so-
called "traditional attorney-client privilege," at its inception it was a
change in the historical role of the privilege. 162 Upjohn focused on
utility, predictability, and other pragmatic realities of the corporate
structure, rather than just the attorney-client relationship.1 63
Furthermore, rather than rely on historical precepts, the Court used
policy reasons-incentivizing self-policing and compliance programs,
protecting the attorney's fact-gathering role in the corpqrate context,
and increasing predictability-to justify the privilege's extension. 64
160. Richter, supra note 35, at 158. In response to the "hue and cry," the Advisory
Committee found the question of selective waiver "essentially political" and deleted the selective
waiver provision from the proposed waiver rule. Id.
161. See Neil, supra note 132 ("[Plrivilege waivers have been commonplace . .
162. Upjohn reflected a willingness to interpret the privilege in terms of the realistic needs of
corporations. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1981):
In the corporate context, however, it will frequently be employees.., who
will possess the information needed by the corporation's lawyers ....
[E]mployees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil
the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these
employees would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel
if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential
difficulties.
Jeanne Andrea Di Grazio, Note, The Calculus of Confidentiality: Ethical and Legal Approaches
to the Labyrinth of Corporate Attorney-Client Communications via E-mail and the Internet -
From Upjohn Co. v. United States and Its Progeny to the Hand Calculus Revisited and Revised,
23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 553, 570 (1998) (noting that, after Upjohn, "[i]t was no longer necessary to
consider the rigid, narrow, and formalistic approach taken by the court of appeals because it
simply did not work in the context of the complex dynamics of a large corporation").
163. See supra note 162.
164. See supra Part II.A.
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Selective waiver's pragmatic resolution of the conflict is supported by
Upjohn.165
Selective waiver may promote internal compliance
investigations-an Upjohn policy-because it combats the riskiness of
gathering the information that may be used later.166 Having the option
to keep the fruits of investigations confidential would, within this
culture of waiver, allay fears of creating third-party liability; thus, a
corporation could investigate without risking that work would be
"leaked" by waiving the privilege. While the lack of third-party
liability may decrease financial punishment of misdeeds, the ease and
efficiency of government investigations would help prevent harm to
the public that results from corporate malfeasance.
Upjohn also tried to protect attorneys' fact-finding role by
promoting cooperation and efficiency. If corporations are permitted to
cooperate with government investigations by selectively waiving the
privilege, they will have a greater incentive to encourage frank
communication between employees and attorneys because the fruits of
internal investigations are less likely to haunt the corporation in
subsequent civil litigation. 167  Promoting government access to
information through the corporation's own internal investigation 168
would disincentivize corporate malfeasance, aid government
investigations, and increase incentives for internal compliance checks.
Finally, codifying selective waiver would engender the same
amount of predictability that is present with the ACPPA, if not more.
The Committee Note for Proposed Rule 502 explains that "[p]arties to
litigation need to know.., that if they exchange privileged
information pursuant to a confidentiality order, the court's order will
be enforceable."1 69 This would increase predictability for corporate
165. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 538:
If the Court seeks to uphold the values set forth in Upjohn, it should resolve
the current circuit conflict by recognizing selective waiver of the attorney-
client privilege because selective waiver would still permit the government to
investigate wrongdoing in the most efficient way possible, while recognizing
the realities of competing incentives and practical application of the privilege
in the corporate context.
166. See id. at 536 ("[A]cceptance of the doctrine of selective waiver could eliminate a
disincentive for self-policing and promote the performance of internal investigations.").
Furthermore, a "mere request for a governmental privilege waiver may result in release of
sensitive information to adverse private litigants, thus exposing the corporation to extensive
liability." Id.
167. See id. at 533 (finding as speculative the argument that "officers and employees might
be less forthcoming with information if they knew that the employer could disclose the privileged
information to the government").
168. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
169. SMITH, supra note 7, at 9.
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attorneys because they would know that third parties would not be
able to access privileged information.170 As one scholar noted:
[A] bright-line approach serves to discourage cooperation with the government, thus
failing to promote the public interest in efficient prosecutions of corporations through
cooperative efforts. Selective waiver provides a more favorable type of predictability
because it encourages government cooperation and allows corporations to be more
certain about the impact of disclosure in terms of private litigation.
1 7 1
Unpredictability breeds tension between a corporate officer's personal
liability and that of the company. Taking the risk of civil liability out
of the equation by allowing corporations to waive their privilege just to
the government would eliminate the perverse incentive of the
corporate executive to abrogate his fiduciary duties.
Proposed Rule 502 is the best way to reduce the tension that
the unpredictability of selective waiver causes, and to further the
policy principles making selective waiver an effective way to promote
compliance. However, Rule 502 extends waiver to other government
agencies, which is problematic. 172 Under Proposed Rule 502, a waiver
to the DOJ about one act may lead to SEC investigations of related
actions. The officer making the decision may in time become aware of
this and make decisions to reduce or eliminate incarceration risks,
incurring fines not only from the investigating agency but potentially
from other agencies as well. Thus, the corporate executive may take
his personal stake in all government investigations into account when
making waiver decisions. Overall, this loophole creates the same
problem for the corporation as does the threat of third-party liability,
perhaps to an even greater extent. Any government indictment
against a corporation would affect the corporation's reputation, which
may alter stock prices and create an even greater incentive for an
officer to protect his own interests instead of those of the corporation.
Also, Proposed Rule 502 may promote collusion between different
170. See Raymond E. Watts, Jr., Comment, Reconciling Voluntary Disclosure with the
Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: A Move Toward a Comprehensive Limited Waiver Doctrine,
39 MERCER L. REV. 1341, 1348 (1988) (noting the limited waiver theory in Diversified furthers
the same goal of predictability encouraged in Upjohn).
171. Weiss, supra note 19, at 532 (internal citations omitted).
172. See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding broad subject
matter waiver pursuant to the "rule of implied waiver," where "any disclosure of a confidential
communication outside a privileged relationship will waive the privilege as to all information
related to the same subject matter"); see also In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ("When a party reveals part of a privileged communication in order to gain an advantage




government agencies. 173 Allowing selective waiver via the proposed
language of the Federal Rule may be the proverbial swallowing of the
spider to catch the fly.
D. Newly Enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 502
In place of the now-withdrawn Rule 502, Senator Patrick
Leahy introduced a new version of the rule on December 11, 2007
("New Rule 502").174 However, the focus of the new legislation seems to
be upon protecting information covered by the attorney-client privilege
in the wake of inadvertent disclosure. 175 Notably absent from the New
Rule 502 is a provision for the doctrine of selective waiver. 176 In its
stead is section (d): "[a] Federal court may order that the privilege or
protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation
pending before the court-in which event the disclosure is also not a
waiver in any other Federal or State proceeding."1 77 Essentially, the
judge decides on a case-by-case basis whether privileged information
divulged pursuant to a government cooperation agreement is
selectively waived as to third parties.178
As the circuits currently are divided over recognition of the
doctrine of selective waiver and some districts have already embraced
a case-by-case analysis, it is uncertain what, if any, remedial or
ameliorative impact this law may have on selective waiver. Entrusting
to courts particularized determinations about implementation of a
controversial doctrine likely would result in little change. District
courts in "settled" jurisdictions may tailor their analyses to that of the
presiding circuit court's interpretation out of fear of reversal, and in
unsettled jurisdictions, judges still may find the same precedent
persuasive. Such individualized determinations would not generate
the predictability necessary to eliminate perverse incentives, and they
would further justify waiver of the attorney-client privilege by
corporate executives in abdication of their fiduciary duty.
173. While it is easy to see the government enforcement agencies as a "whole" promoting
corporate actions in compliance with the law, government agencies, for the most part, may also
have differing objectives.
174. Act of Sept. 19, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-322, § 1(d), 122 Stat. 3537 (2008), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-2450.
175. Posting of Brendan Smith to The BLT: The Blog of LegalTimes, http:/legaltimes.
typepad.comlblt/2007/12/voyage-of-disco.html (Dec. 13, 2007, 12:25 EST).
176. White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http:/Ilawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_
blog/congress/index.html (Dec. 15, 2007).




IV. CODIFICATION OF SELECTIVE WAIVER AS A PRAGMATIC RE-
ALIGNMENT OF INCENTIVES
Three potential solutions to the uncertainty surrounding the
waiver of attorney-client privilege pursuant to government agency
investigations are still viable: the DOJ memoranda principles, the
ACPPA, and the newly enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 502.
However, none of these potential solutions passes muster in light of
the culture of waiver and the practical realities of the corporate world.
Each of these proposed solutions, by failing to properly account for the
negative externalities imposed by its respective "remed[y]," either
sidesteps the problem of selective waiver or, in attempting to solve the
problem, creates equally threatening pressures on the attorney-client
privilege doctrine. Codifying selective waiver is the only way to: (1)
eliminate the perverse incentives for executive decision-making
caused by current unsettled waiver jurisprudence; (2) serve public and
penal policies regarding corporate crime and malfeasance; and (3)
preserve the traditional values underlying the policies recognized by
the attorney-client privilege. Although such a codification is similar to
the Advisory Committee's Proposed Rule 502,179 a revised version
would protect against waiver to other government agencies and
private parties.
A. Available Solutions Fail to Remove the Perverse Incentives for
Corporate Executives
1. DOJ Memoranda and the ACPPA
Neither the DOJ memoranda nor the ACPPA provides a
workable solution because neither creates predictability. The guidance
provided by the DOJs ° to restrict requests for waiver to cases in
which it is strictly necessary has done little to weaken the pervasive
culture of waiver. The inertia of this culture increases the pressure on
corporate executives to waive the privilege; all the while, the
executives can cite cooperation with the government as an additional
defense to legitimize their decisions to waive the corporation's
privilege. Relatedly, the ACPPA's efforts to eliminate the request of
such waivers altogether are also based on a legal fiction of
voluntariness, which assumes that these executives actually have a
179. See supra Part III.C.
180. See supra Part III.B.2.
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choice in waiving the privilege. While the ACPPA disallows explicit
requests for waiver or the receipt of government benefits conditioned
on such waiver agreements, the allowance for "voluntary" (i.e., not
agency requested) waiver provides corporate executives who face
individual liability with an implicit motivation to waive the privilege.
Additionally, while the ACPPA would proscribe directly benefiting
from such cooperation, in practice such waiver would still occur. Thus,
executives would continue to value protection from their own
liabilities over their companies' privilege with shareholders who are
bereft of the judicial scrutiny available when waiver is made pursuant
to clear government cooperation agreements.
It is equally unrealistic, given the nature of criminal
investigations in the corporate context, to allow either the DOJ
Memoranda or the ACPPA to significantly erode or eliminate the
doctrine of selective waiver. Attorney-client privilege waiver is too
important to the truth-seeking process in these investigations, which
provide deterrence and retributive justice for corporate crime and
malfeasance. These policies cannot, and must not, yield in their
entirety under the banner of the attorney-client privilege. Better
solutions are needed to reconcile these competing imperatives.
2. New Federal Rule 502
The newly enacted language of the New Rule 502181 does
nothing to remedy the predictability problem of selective waiver,
although the unsettled nature of selective waiver is the crux of the
tension between a corporate executive's personal liability and his
fiduciary duties. New Rule 502 would cause unpredictability; courts
would still be forced to wrestle with questions regarding the
application of selective waiver on a case-by-case basis. In practice,
provision (d)18 2 of the New Rule 502 would actually increase
unpredictability because jurisdictions that had previously rejected the
doctrine of selective waiver would be forced to reconsider the doctrine.
Of course, courts could continue to reject the doctrine in its entirety on
a case-by-case basis, but the possibility of selective waiver that would
result would undermine the major policy reason posited by rejecting
courts-that selective waiver is not encompassed by traditional
attorney-client privilege.
Under the auspices of the New Rule 502, executives waiving
corporate attorney-client privilege in the face of significant personal




liability would have an additional shield to bolster their defense of the
reasonableness of that decision if such waiver resulted in third-party
liability for the corporation. Executives could point to the New Rule
502 as a justification for their decision to waive the privilege while
recognizing that the courts in that jurisdiction are unlikely to exercise
their discretion to allow selective waiver.
B. A New Proposal to Codify Selective Waiver
Corporations that waive the privilege in the culture of waiver
often have their previously privileged documents requested by private
plaintiffs.18 3 In the corporate world, with the increasing importance of
government investigations and a persistent culture of waiver, waiver
of the attorney-client privilege will occur. These practical
considerations must be addressed given the reality of corporate
decisionmaking, and selective waiver allows for a more pragmatic
approach to dispel the negative externalities associated with attorney-
client privilege waiver pursuant to government investigations. This
practicability is supported by Upjohn's pragmatic alteration of the
traditional attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. As was
the case before Upjohn, the goals of the ACPPA, the DOJ Memoranda,
and even the New Rule 502 do not allow for a realistic application of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate environment.
For the most part, opponents of selective waiver generally tout
the traditional rationale for the attorney-client privilege: protecting
privileged communications and facilitating the attorney-client
relationship. These courts and commentators condemn the tactical use
of selective waiver as working against this traditional focus. They fear
that the waiver of attorney-client privilege would be used as a "sword"
in litigation rather than as a shield of confidentiality.1 8 4 Contrary to
these concerns, however, selective waiver would not have any effect on
the litigation for which the material was waived but would merely
prevent additional litigation. Selective waiver would not effectively
deny third parties any cognizable right because their potential suits
183. See Letter from Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass'n of
Corporate Counsel, to the Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice
& Procedure (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.acc.compublic/attyclientpriv/502acc.pdf
("Given this 'culture of waiver,' situations are common in which private plaintiffs seek the
disclosure of privileged documents which a company previously was coerced to provide to
government enforcers.").
184. For example, a party may choose only to disclose two documents out of ten, the two best
for that party, and resulting in those two documents being the only evidence on that particular
issue available for trial. This practice would have a direct effect on the litigation process itself.
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could not be prosecuted absent the requested disclosure of privileged
documents during government investigation.
Not only is selective waiver necessary in the corporate context,
but codification of a selective waiver rule is necessary for
predictability. Commentators agree that such predictability is
necessary, and many have advanced sound policy considerations in
support of selective waiver clauses. 185 The uncertainty surrounding
selective waiver is the primary reason an executive faces a perverse
incentive when deciding whether to waive the privilege during
investigations. The only workable solution to this dilemma is to codify
selective waiver, allowing for predictable judicial recognition and
protection from third-party liability.
In 2006, the Judicial Conference drafted an initial proposal
(now withdrawn) to codify selective waiver in the Proposed Rule 502.
The proposal posited a rule for selective waiver, effectively generating
predictability that would better align corporate executives' personal
interests with those of the corporation and its shareholders. It
accomplished this task by eliminating the risk of third-party liability
created when executives waive a corporation's privilege in order to
shield themselves from individual criminal sanctions. 186 However, the
proposal's language did nothing to prevent secondary liability to the
government itself. Thus, even if an executive gets "cooperation"
incentives for one government investigation, it may be subject to a
different investigation; this clearly does not eliminate the perverse
incentive. While a corporate executive may be personally liable for
conduct during one government investigation, he may waive the
privilege for his benefit, and another government agency may use the
privileged information to seek damages from the corporation akin to
third-party liability. Additionally, potential collusion between agencies
to obtain indictments may undermine executives' willingness to
cooperate.
Codification is necessary to create a workable solution to the
problems associated with selective waiver. By keeping the selective
waiver viable and providing the requisite predictability through a
codification of a selective waiver rule, there is the potential to
eliminate the antithetical relationship between executives and the
corporations whose interests they purport to protect. However, as
185. See, e.g., Nancy C. Crisman & Arthur F. Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Internal Corporate Investigations: An Emerging
Corporate "Self-Evaluative" Privilege, 21 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 123, 123 (1983) (questioning
"whether legislation of a federal corporate 'self-evaluative' privilege would eliminate the existing
confusion respecting limited waiver").
186. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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mentioned, the loophole created through the "non-government entity"
language of the Proposed Rule 502 imposes more potential negative
externalities on the corporation from the risk of government liability
than its drafters realized. To reconstruct the language in accordance
with these goals and to close this remaining loophole, this Note
proposes the following language for a pragmatic rule on selective
waiver:
Selective Waiver. In a federal or state proceeding, disclosure of a communication or
information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection-when
made to a federal public office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative,
or enforcement authority-does not operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in
favor of any person or entity other than that specific public office or agency, and only for
the limited purposes of the specific regulatory, investigative, or enforcement action
currently underway at the time when the disclosure is requested.
These amended concepts from the Judicial Conference's
Proposed Rule 502 further the positive policies of selective waiver
while reducing or eliminating its negative externalities. Thus, either
the New Rule 502 should be amended in order to incorporate this
essential language from the now-abandoned Proposed Rule 502 (as
illustrated above), or, failing that, new legislation with the above
language should be introduced to protect selective waiver and
preserve its pragmatic approach to the realities of the corporate
context.
Choosing to codify selective waiver as a federal rule admittedly
would go against the holdings of a majority of the courts that have
decided the issue. Courts denying corporations the option of selective
waiver do so because it goes against the traditional notions and
purpose for which the privilege is designed. They note that the
privilege is not necessary for governments to conduct investigations
and should not be used as a tactical litigation tool. However, these
criticisms go against the practical realities of these investigations in
this culture of waiver, where gaining the information would be
expensive and time-consuming for government agencies, and corporate
executives have perverse incentives for waiving the privilege. Only an
adoption of selective waiver in a predictable, codified form as above
works with the realities of corporate attorney-client privilege.
The New Rule 502, by leaving the language governing selective
waiver ambiguous, in effect only codifies the unsettled nature of the
law. This provides little certainty to selective waiver--only its
unpredictability will be predictable. By codifying the doctrine of
selective waiver as suggested here, Congress would further the policy
goals of promdting corporate investigations while maintaining the
traditional nature of the attorney-client privilege in accordance with
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the precepts of Upjohn, thereby calibrating the alignment of a
corporate executive's personal interests and fiduciary duties.
V. CONCLUSION: RECONCILIATION OF COMPETING IMPERATIVES
The principles enunciated in Upjohn require a reconciliation of
competing policy imperatives to formulate the most effective, efficient,
and pragmatic manner to apply attorney-client privilege waivers to
government investigations. There are two important considerations to
be balanced with the resolution of the potentially antithetical
relationship between the decisionmaking of corporate executives and
their fiduciary duties to the corporation: (1) the promotion of
cooperation with government criminal investigations and (2) the
preservation of the traditional doctrine of attorney-client privilege.
Both government and internal investigations further the search for
truth and protect the interests of shareholders and the general public
from corporate crimes, but any proposed remedy must uphold the
sanctity of the attorney-client privilege defined in Upjohn, while
allowing for the pragmatic approach necessitated by the corporate
environment.
The two considerations mentioned above must be reconciled
with the perverse incentives created by the current unsettled
jurisprudence of selective waiver and the resulting tension with
executives' fiduciary duties. Codification of selective waiver as this
Note proposes is the best resolution to alleviate this tension. It
synthesizes these considerations, recognizes the fundamental realities
of the corporate world in light of the inherent necessities of white-
collar criminal investigations, and promotes predictability in the
waiver decision. Overall, codification eliminates the perverse
incentives created by judicial uncertainty while maintaining the
principles of attorney-client privilege under Upjohn within a culture of
waiver.
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